


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# COAST GUARD RESERVIST

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## RESERVISTS COMBAT NEW HAVEN OIL SPILL

Saturday, 23 January 1971 was to have been a routine day for New Haven's ORTUPS(O) 03-82270, commanded by LCDR A. R. MATT, Jr. A boat cradle was scheduled for re-construction, some pier inspections were to be made, and the routine paperwork of the unit was to be worked on. At 0530 that morning, the tanker ESSO GETTYSBURG started a chain of events which changed these plans. Proceeding into New Haven harbor in heavy fog and light snow the tanker grounded on a ledge near the harbor entrance and immediately began leaking oil. The ESSO GETTYSBURG proceeded on up the channel and moored at its terminal to begin off loading and to survey its damage. A company sub-contractor began placing confinement booms around the ship and the pier area, but in all, over 350,000 gallons of light heating oil were spilled.

At about 0845 COTP New Haven contacted the unit and requested assistance of the Port Security Section of

COTP New London in gathering preliminary information. As the morning progressed, a variety of Coast Guard activities commenced. MIO New London came to New Haven to commence its investigation. The USCGC REDWOOD was directed to check the positions of aids in New Haven Harbor. A helicopter (which later rescued the crews of a news service helicopter which crashed while covering the story) was dispatched from Coast Guard Air Station, Brooklyn, for aerial survey of the extent of the oil slick. GRUCOM New London requested that personnel from the ORTUPS augment the personnel of New Haven Station in conducting beach patrols to determine the extent and position of the major portions of the slick.

The Port Security Section split up into two groups—one covering the west side of the harbor, and one covering the east side (where most of the pollution was concentrated by the winds and tide.) PSC W. C. RICHMOND, undergoing an E-8 evaluation by COTP New York, was "loaned" back to his unit for their operations.


Beach patrols were commenced about 1300 and were maintained until after 1600 when darkness prevented further detection of oil movements in the harbor.

Sunday morning, seven beach patrols of five men each were dispatched. All

of the beach patrol personnel were outfitted with foul weather gear and hard hats (which made for rapid identification—even from the air) and were briefed on the current situation and advised not to make speculative statements about potential damage resulting from the spill to the now growing array of news service personnel converging on New Haven. Patrols continued throughout Sunday, with many inquiries being received from the press, and from local residents who were conducting their own surveys of the affected areas.

Later Sunday afternoon the ORTU Commanding Officer was requested to

SEE "OIL"—BACK PAGE



*The Coast Guard Cutter SAUK at work on the Hudson River.*




## Leadership School— Yorktown

First, move two dozen men from a 10-front diving board into a pool without making a splash. When all men are in the water, direct them in the construction of a bridge made from inner tubes, a few planks, and some line. Build it strong enough to support a man on a 20-foot walk and complete the entire project silently, with no words spoken.

That is only one of the problems encountered during Leadership School during the Summer ACDUTRA program at Reserve Training Center, Yorktown.

Reservists enrolled in the course are told very little beyond the fact that they will be presented with a number of problems designed to help each of them understand the complexities of leadership and evaluate their own abilities as a leader. They are urged to keep an open mind throughout the course.

Some of the problems are concerned with the operation of RTC, and include discipline, inspections, etc., some are classroom discussions and debates on topics of world importance, and still others are the "nitty-gritty" of the course.



This latter group of problems includes game with leaders directing blindfolded teams, and many problems involving small teams of escaping "prisoners of war" who try to solve obstacles such as "washed-out bridges", "mine

fields", "pools of piranha" or a double fence ("don't touch"). Just to make life difficult, the prisoners must carry a 55-gallon drum of "delicate electronic equipment" (don't drop").

On the last day of the course all the students work on an involved problem similar to the other escaping prisoners problems, but much more complex.

Reservist who attend Leadership School generally find that they learn more about themselves than do other trainees at Yorktown. They also get dirtier, stretch more muscles, wear out more clothes, get into more arguments, and have more fun.

The present format of the course was devised in 1965 by now LCDR James PYPHER, Jr., and LT John F. RUMP, who continue to direct the leadership school for 125-plus second class to chiefs who take the course each summer.



*Students (in this case OC's) solving some of the problems in Leadership.*

## Seat Belts

There is indisputable evidence that safety belts protect vehicle occupants involved in accidents and reduce substantially the deaths and injuries caused by such accidents. This is vividly demonstrated by Richard Petty in the Coast Guard produced film, "Mission: Control." This film is now available to all Coast Guard units from their District offices.

Since October 1962, the Coast Guard

has required that occupants of Government vehicles wear safety belts. The evidence that this requirement has been and is being ignored is as certain as is the evidence that safety belts save lives. This failure to wear safety belts has now become a disciplinary matter. Commandant Instruction 10470.1B (dated 28 July 1970) reiterates the requirements for installation and use of safety belts in Government vehicles and informs personnel of some of the consequences for failing to use them. It requires all military drivers of and passengers in Government vehicles to wear safety belts while the vehicle is in operation.


Failure of civilian personnel to use safety belts in automobiles while on official business is covered by disciplinary measures set forth in Commandant Instruction 12750.2.

Whenever a Coast Guardsman is injured in an automobile accident it is necessary to make a determination of whether or not the injury was incurred in the line of duty and whether or not such injury resulted from the individual's own misconduct. Commandant Instruction 10470.1B indicates that a determination of misconduct may be in order should a Coast Guardsman be injured while in a Government vehicle without his safety belt fastened and there is clear and convincing evidence that use of the safety belts would have prevented such injury. A misconduct determination may result in the loss of such benefits as physical disability retirement and severance pay.

The driver of a Government vehicle is responsible for the safety of his passengers and therefore must require all passengers to comply with the provisions of the Commandant Instruction. The Commandant Instruction prohibits a military driver from commencing operation of a Government vehicle until he has ascertained that each passenger has fastened his seat belt. If the driver fails to direct his passengers to fasten their safety belts, and if the senior military passenger is senior to the driver, the senior military passenger is responsible for directing the driver and other passengers to comply with the provisions of the Commandant Instruction.

Safe driving habits should not be limited to Government vehicles only. In view of the mounting tragic and costly results of the non-use of seat belts, it behooves each member of the Coast Guard Reserve to insure that he and each passenger in the family car "buckle up" before the engine is started. Complacency kills.





## THE ADMIRAL'S CORNER

In May 1971, I will be detached from the duties of Chief, Office of Reserve, and will report to New Orleans for duty as Commander, Eighth Coast Guard District. Rear Admiral James W. MOREAU, presently Chief, Operations Division of the Fourteenth Coast Guard District has been designated as my relief. For the past three years, it has been my privilege to serve with and come to know many of you as leaders of and/or constructive participants in our Reserve organization. From first hand observations, I say that our Coast Guard Reserve is composed of thousands of highly dedicated individuals whose patriotism, capabilities, motivation and initiative are outstanding.

These three years have not been without turbulence; reductions in strength, proposed phase-out, restructuring, changes to the officer promotion system, etc., have complicated Reserve training and administration. Nevertheless, much progress has been made within our program. Most indicative of this progress is in the RL and RP programs. In these, all RL personnel are now at least qualified for advancement to E-3 when completing initial ACDUTRA and RP personnel complete a Class A service school within their initial ACDUTRA period. Today, more enlisted men are taking (and passing) servicewide examinations than ever before, with advancement up accordingly. The E-8 and E-9 program and the warrant to LTJG program have been instituted to provide advancement or promotion opportunities to some of our more senior petty officers and warrant officers. Through more utilization of the FITS and Port Security curriculums, and closer monitoring of correspondence course progress, the number of non-rated personnel has been greatly reduced. The conversion to the best qualified officer promotion system has been made. We have begun equipping ORTUPS (O)'s with 31 foot Port Security boats. During drills and periods of ACDUTRA, on both routine and emergency basis, reservists have rendered considerable assistance to the operating

forces of the Coast Guard, including assistance during two major oil pollution incidents. There are many other improvements in various stages of planning and implementation which will serve to upgrade the overall effectiveness of the Reserve.

The past three years have been ones which provided all of us with great challenge, but of greatest significance to me: I have been provided with an "inside" view of one of the least known resources of the Coast Guard. In leaving this post, I am confident of several things. First of all, the Coast Guard Reserve's greatest asset—the individual reservists—are and will remain dedicated to the Service and will continue to put forth their greatest possible effort to maintain and improve the effectiveness of the Coast Guard Reserve. Secondly, my relief, RADM MOREAU, is a knowledgeable and dedicated officer who will carry on the program in the best interest of the nation. Last but certainly not least, although I will no longer be in contact with the *entire* Reserve program, I will have contact with the reservists of the Eighth Coast Guard District. These reservists have done and are doing outstanding work, both in the field of military preparedness and in support, on a purely voluntary basis, during domestic emergencies. While I hope that the Eighth District will be free from such emergencies in the future, I am confident that if the need arises, our reservists will rise to the challenge.

I will shortly be officially detached



RADM J. D. McCUBBIN, received a Department of Defense Certificate of Appreciation for his work with the Reserve Forces Policy Board. The Chairman of the RFPB, The Honorable John Slezak, presented the Certificate, as VADM T. R. SARGENT III looked on.

from my Reserve duties. With me I will carry many memories and impressions from my tour as Chief of the Coast Guard Reserve. I know that you will provide the same support to the Coast Guard through the Reserve under RADM MOREAU that you have given me, and you will have mutually beneficial tours.

JOHN D. McCUBBIN

## FIRE TRAINING

One of the vital functions of a Port Security unit is the prevention and control of fire. Thus, many hours of classes in any ORTUPS unit are devoted to teaching reservists the proper use and maintenance of firefighting equipment.



Recently, the men of ORTUPS 03-82205 (Bridgeport, Conn.) were provided the opportunity to supplement their classroom training with the valuable experience of actually fighting fires in a controlled situation. This was provided through the association of a number of men in the Bridgeport unit with members of a volunteer fire department in nearby Derby, Connecticut. This town has an excellent regional training facility which had been used by many other groups throughout the state. Its able instructors, Paul Grant and Arthur Fredericks of Storm Engine Company, donated their time and efforts one Saturday to taking the men of 82205 through a training session which included fighting an oil fire, a tank fire,



and a house fire. All of the lines and equipment were provided by the Derby Fire Department. This illustrates how cooperation with local groups can lead to meaningful training for the mutual benefit of the community as well as the Coast Guard Reserve.



# SURVIVAL— Maybe Yours

Background: During a night SAR case, a 40' utility boat sank abruptly in 80' of water. The crew only had time to broadcast "We're sinking fast" and cut loose the balsa life raft. All three were wearing wet suits. They spent seven hours in the water clinging to the raft. Water temperature was 56°, air temperature 26°, wind velocity 20-25 knots which gave a chill factor of 0°. A Coast Guard helicopter rescued them at dawn, and took them to the hospital where they were examined and released. *All three survivors are convinced that they would have died from exposure if they had not been wearing wet suits.*

Only the coxswain was wearing a flight suit over his wet suit. He believes this kept him warmer than the other two men. Two men were wearing the wet suit hood. The third had on a wool watch cap. He was much colder than the two wearing the hood. None of the men were wearing the wet suit boots. Their feet were very cold. Life jackets were stowed in the cabin and there was not enough time to get them out. Wet suits provided enough flotation to save

their lives.

The coxswain maintained effective command throughout the time they were in the water. They kept warm by moving about and kept their spirits up by singing. Both measures were effective.

Emergencies can happen to you—fast and with no warning. Emergency equipment should be available from the time you leave the dock until you return.

The wet suit works! Wear it—all of it. It may save your life!



*RADM Mark A. WHALEN, Commander, Western Area and the Twelfth Coast Guard District, presents the first E-8 Reserve Certificate under his jurisdiction to SKCS Rudolph J. BANUELOS, USCGR, of ORTUPS 12-82800, Monterey, California.*

## RESERVE VESSEL SUMMER 1971 CRUISE SCHEDULE USCGC UNIMAK (WTR 379)

Dates	Embark-Debark	Port of Call
13-26 June	US NOB, Norfolk, Va.	Willemstad, Curacao
11-24 Jul	US Naval Base Charleston, S.C.	Barbados, W.I.
1-13 Aug	USCG Base Boston Boston, Mass.	St. Thomas, V.I.
15-27 Aug	New York, N.Y.	Quebec, Canada

It should be noted that the Willemstad and Barbados cruises are of fourteen days duration.

## USCGC TANAGER (WTR 885)

Dates	District	Embark	Debark	Port of Call
6-18 Jun	12	TRASUPCEN Alameda	Pier Charlie Long Beach	Mazatlan, Mexico
20 Jun-2 Jul	11	Pier Charlie Long Beach	Pier Charlie Long Beach	Pier 45 San Francisco
18-30 Jul	11	Pier Charlie Long Beach	Pier 91 Seattle	Pier 45 San Francisco
1-13 Aug	13	Pier 91 Seattle	Pier 91 Seattle	Juneau, Alaska
15-27 Aug	13	Pier 91 Seattle	TRASUPCEN Alameda	Pier 45 San Francisco

"OIL"—from front page

provide 8 to 12 volunteers for additional patrols for the next few days. It was feared that although the oil was light and was being dissipated by wind and wave action, the moderating weather would melt some of the ice in the harbor, permitting more oil to be carried onto the beaches. Fifteen men volunteered and eight were selected for SPAC-DUTRA on Monday and four men were available for duty on Tuesday. By Tuesday evening the situation had stabilized sufficiently that the services of the reservists were no longer required and they were released.

During the period of assistance to the Regular forces, the Coast Guardsmen worked together with no distinction made between Regular and Reserve personnel, except for publicity purposes (Reserve personnel augmenting Regular forces.) In his official report LCDR MATT, stated that "From my view point . . . (the clean up operation) . . . was a tremendous morale builder for the men of my unit. The emergency nature . . . welded them . . . into a cohesive working force. The point that Reserve personnel are dedicated loyal and responsible young men was once again proved."

Fortunately, due to a combination of the type of oil involved, the presence of considerable ice in the harbor, and the prevailing wind and current conditions, and last but certainly not least the rapid response of Coast Guard forces, damage was kept to a minimum but the New Haven spill certainly brought to the forefront the necessity for our personnel to be "Always Ready."

## The Coast Guard RESERVIST

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Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard

RADM J. D. McCUBBIN  
Chief, Office of Reserve

LTJG R. C. BROWN  
CWO H. M. KERN  
Editors

All photographs are official Coast Guard material unless otherwise designated.

Members of the Coast Guard Reserve are invited to submit articles of interest to the Editor of RESERVIST for possible publication.